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FEDERAL COURTS-CERTIFICATION
TION: A RETURN TO FEDERALISM

BEFORE FACIAL INVALIDA

INTRODUCTION

A federal court is often asked to review the constitutionality of a
state statute before a state court has had the opportunity to interpret
the statute. A first amendment overbreadth challenge to a state stat
ute is a common example} In such a situation, the federal'court must
proceed with caution and restraint before invalidating the state law in
order to avoid the possibility of unnecessary interference with a state
regulatory program. 2 On the other hand, before upholding the statute,
the federal court must also consider the potential "chilling effect"3 on
protected activity.4 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that
"[i]n accommodating these competing interests . . . a state statute
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to
1. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine permits a federal court to invalidate a
federal or state statute because it is susceptible of application to a substantial amount of
protected expression. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-70 (1982). See infra notes
67-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment overbreadth doctrine.
2. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
3. "Chilling effect" is a term of art in constitutional law that focuses attention on the
practical consequences of state action and its effect on individual conduct. See generally
Schauer, Fear. Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L.
REv. 685 (1978); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808,
808 (1969). A "chilling" of constitutional rights occurs when an individual must choose
between risking prosecution for engaging in some conduct or foregoing that conduct. The
deterrence arises from the fear that lawful conduct may be punished through prosecution
under a government regulation not specifically directed at the protected activity. Schauer,
supra, at 693. The chilling effect is most frequently noted in first amendment cases, but can
apply to any individual right setting. Note, supra, at 808; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (A statute's very existence may cause other individuals not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (noting that the chilling effect may derive from the very
fact of prosecution, regardless of its success or failure).
4. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216 (recognizing "that a demonstrably overbroad statute
... may deter the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights"). Even if the law is
upheld, it may not be clear what behavior the statute prohibits. Error and uncertainty in
the legal system make it difficult to predict the outcome of litigation. For instance, laws
may be erroneously declared or improperly applied to the facts. Thus, a chilling effect may
always be present because of the "fear that lawful conduct may nonetheless be punished
because of the fallibility inherent in the legal process." See Schauer, supra note 3, at 694
95.
217

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

218

[Vol. 12:217

a narrowing constI'Uction by the state courts,"S and "its deterrent ef
fect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial."6
A federal court reviewing the constitutionality of an unconstI'Ued
state statute may proceed in one of three ways. First, under the doc
trine established in Railroad Commission v. Pullman CO.7 ("Pullman
abstention"), a federal court can decline to adjudicate the federal con
stitutional issue until a state court has had the opportunity to constI'Ue
the statute authoritatively.s Abstention is a discretionary power9
which federal courts should invoke only when a definitive I'Uling on
the state issue will terminate or substantially alter the federal contro
versy.1O In addition, the costly nature of abstention II works against its
application when the statute allegedly abridges free expression or dis
courages protected activities. 12 Thus, federal courts may opt to I'Ule
on the merits of the controversy without the benefit of an authoritative
state interpretation.
The second option, proceeding to the merits, defeats the purpose
of Pullman abstention, which is to recognize state independence and
maintain an efficient federal jUdiciary. 13 Furthermore, in the absence
of an authoritative constI'Uction of the state statute, it is often difficult
to define precisely the constitutional question presented. 14
The third option is to invoke a state certification procedure, a
5.

Erznoznik, 422

u.s.

at 216 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497

(1965».
6. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973».
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
8. When a federal court abstains, it is avoiding answering a constitutional question
prematurely since an interpretation of the state statute could obviate the need to resolve the
constitutional question. "The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a
federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of the state court." Id. at 500.
Thus, Pullman abstention is an equitable power which allows federal courts to further the
harmonious relations between state and federal authority. Id. at 501.
9.

Id.

10. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167,
177 (1959); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.
11. Abstention forces litigants to initiate a state court proceeding on the state law
issues, which obviously delays final adjudication and increases the expense to the litigants.
See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for further discussion of the burdens absten
tion imposes upon litigants.
12. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 252 (1967) (observing that the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the
impermissible chilling of the constitutional right sought to be protected); see also Note,
Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the Boundaries, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1243, 1248-49 (1986).
13. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
14. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 148; see also City of Houstonv. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 473
(1987) (powell, J., dissenting) ("Constitutional analysis should not proceed until we deter
mine the precise meaning of the ordinance in question.").
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subset of the abstention doctrine which arises under state law. A fed
eral court may choose to make use of a state certification statute or
rule in order to obtain an authoritative answer to a state law question
before the court proceeds to the merits of the constitutional question. I S
Thus, certification furthers the interests of federalism by providing a
state court with the opportunity to decide an issue of state law before
being precluded from doing so by a contrary federal court decision. 16
Because the state law question goes directly to the highest court of the
state, certification is less costly to litigants than abstention~ 17 Conse
quently, certification presents the best way to accommodate a reason
able balance between principles of federalism and the expeditious relief
required when constitutionally protected rights are potentially at
stake. IS
Two problems, however, prevent successful use of certification
procedures in the first amendment overbreadth situation. First, the
test for certification - whether a statute is readily susceptible to a
narrowing construction which would render an otherwise unconstitu
tional statute constitutional l9 - invites a federal court to make a sub
15. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450
(1989). See generally 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4248 (1988 & Supp. 1989). Thirty-eight states have adopted proce
dures that allow federal courts to certify questions of state law to the highest court of the
state. Id. at 167 n.30; Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis ofState Laws Providing for
Certification by Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues of Law, 42 REc. A. B. CITY
N.Y. 101 app. at 126-54 (1987).
16. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435. Unlike the availability of Supreme Court review when
state courts decide federal issues, there is no possibility of direct review within the state
judiciary when federal courts decide questions of state law. Field, Abstention in Constitu
tional Cases: The Scope ofthe Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1085
(1974). Once a federal court invalidates a state law based upon an erroneous reading of the
state law, a state can only correct the federal decision through legislative enactment or by
initiating judicial proceedings in state court. Since there is no direct review from a federal
court to a state court, any new state proceeding requires a new case or controversy. Id. at
1119 n.I40; see also Wilkins, Certification of Questions ofLaw: The Massachusetts Experi
ence, 74 MASS. L. REV..256,257 n.18 (1989).
17. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 606 (1977). Pro
fessor Field argues that abstention is not worth the costs it imposes on litigants and that if
state court input is necessary for unsettled issues of state law, certification is vastly superior
to abstention. Id. at 605. Professor Field also argues that the benefits of certification are
greater than abstention because the unclear state issue is presented directly to the state
supreme court. Under abstention, there is no guarantee that the state law issue will make
its way through the state judiciary to the state's highest court. Id. at 606-07.
18. "[C]ourts usually perceive certification as a better means of achieving the end for
which abstention was fashioned." Corr & Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and
Choice ofLaw, 41 VAND. L. REv. 411, 417 (1988); see also Committee on Federal Courts,
supra note 15, at 102 (observing that if the issue is posed as one between abstention and
certification, certification usually provides a more expeditious resolution).
19. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435.
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jective judgment it should not make. The test for certification asks a
federal court to determine whether a state statute is susceptible to a
limiting construction and, thus, fails to serve the federalism interests
upon which certification rests since it invites a federal court to decide
the merits of the state law issue. 2o Certification is designed to provide
the opportunity for state court input before a federal court proceeds to
the merits. 21 A standard that encourages federal determination ofthe
state law question leads to the opposite result.
The second problem with the test for certification is that it is un
workable. In answering the question of whether a statute is readily
susceptible to a narrow construction, federal courts attempt to distin
guish between a narrowing construction and a rewriting of the stat
ute. 22 This distinction is illusive. Courts have disagreed and will
continue to disagree over the clarity of statutes. 23 Yet, the clarity of a
statute is of critical importance because a first amendment overbreadth
analysis always requires construction of the statute in question24 and
because a federal court should only certify when the state law issue is
unclear.2s
The recent case of Dorman v. Satti 26 illustrates the problems with
application of the certification standard. The fundamental disagree
ment between the majority opinion and the dissent shows the difficulty
in applying the "readily susceptible" test for certification.27 Further
more, the decision not to certify demonstrates how easily a federal
court can frustrate state legislative policy despite supposed federal
court respect for state independence. 28
This Note will examine the current application of the test for cer
tification in the context of a first amendment overbreadth challenge,
20. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a federal
court must address the merits of the state law question to decide whether to certify.
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction
between narrowly construing and rewriting a statute.
23. See infra note 138 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have
determined when a statute is sufficiently unclear to warrant abstention or certification. See
also infra note 144 and accompanying text.
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 n.16 (1973).
25. Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[C)er
tification procedure is a valuable device for securing prompt and authoritative resolution of
unsettled questions of state law.").
26. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989).
27. See infra notes 79-117 and accompanying text for the facts and reasoning in
Dorman.
28. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text for an analysis of the majority's
decision not to certify the state law questions in Dorman.
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focusing on the reasoning in Dorman. Section I traces the develop
ment of certification and its intended purpose in federal practice. This
section also examines the relationship between certification and facial
invalidation of state statutes. Section II discusses the reasoning in
Dorman. Section III analyzes the Dorman decision in light of the in
tended purpose of certification. Given these purposes, Section III pro
poses that federal courts certify before they invalidate an unconstrued
state statute. Section III also contains a proposal that federal courts
grant interim relief during the certification process to alleviate any
possible chilling of constitutionally protected rights.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF CERTIFICATION

From Abstention to Certification

Certification is largely an outgrowth of Pullman abstention.29
Under the Pullman doctrine, a federal court directs the plaintiff to
begin a state court action on the state law question, usually in the form
of a declaratory judgment action.30 Thus, the parties must undergo
two lawsuits instead of one in order to allow federal and state courts
the opportunity to rule on their own law. 31 The parties may then
choose to litigate both the federal and state claims in state court or to
litigate only the state issue, reserving the right to return to federal
court on the constitutional issue if the plaintiff loses in state court. 32
The additional delay and expense to litigants in maintaining two law
suits is enormous. 33
In contrast to the burdensome abstention doctrine, state certifica
tion statutes provide federal courts with an avenue for posing unclear
questions of state law directly to the state's highest court. 34 The fed
29. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 416.
30. Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, Report on
the Abstention Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Pr0
ceedings, 122 F.R.D. 89, 94 (1988).
31. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 416; see also Field, supra note 17.
32. Field, supra note 17, at 591 (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964»; see also 122 F.R.D. at 94 (also citing England).
33. The Committee on Federal Courts, Subcommittee on Abstention, concluded that
expansion of abstention will have the practical effect of frustrating or unduly delaying the
adjudication of federal claims. 122 F.R.D. at 106-07; see also Corr & Robbins, supra note
18, at 416 ("[A]bstention imposes duplicative litigation on federal and state trial courts and
also imposes a tax on the public treasury."); Field, supra note 17, at 591·92. Abstention
may deter litigants from seeking a federal forum in the first place or it may induce them to
minimize their costs by presenting all issues to the state court, thereby waiving their right
to return to federal court on the federal issues. Professor Field concludes that abstention is
not worth these costs. ld.
34. See supra note 15. In 1945, Florida became the first state to enact an inteIjuris·
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eral court will rule on the merits of the federal question after it re
ceives the state supreme court's answer(s) to the certified question(s).
Unlike abstention, certification bypasses the trial and appellate levels
of state litigation to produce a more expeditious resolution of the state
law issue. 35 Also, in contrast to abstention, certification guarantees
that the state's highest court will have the opportunity to decide the
state law issue. 36 Thus, certification respects state autonomy, while
relieving litigants of some of the burdens imposed by abstention. 37
Despite its advantages over abstention, certification did not play
an important role in the federal courts until recently.38 By 1974, only
a handful of states had adopted certification procedures since Florida's
was enacted in 1945. 39 Without a state certification procedure, a fed
eral court cannot compel a state court to answer questions concerning
state law issues. Several more states, however, enacted certification
statutes and/or rules following the Supreme Court's successful use of
these state procedures in the 1970s.

B.

The Supreme Court View of Certification

In 1974, the Supreme Court recognized the advantages of certifi
cation over abstention in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,4() observing that cer
tification saves "time, energy, and resources and helps build a
cooperative judicial federalism."41 Two years after Lehman Bros., the
Supreme Court again noted the benefits of certification.
In Bellotti v. Baird,42 the Court vacated and remanded a district
court decision to enjoin the operation of a Massachusetts abortion
dictional certification statute. See Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Re
view and Re"Proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 (1979). Enactment of the Florida
certification statute followed closely after the Supreme Court's decision in Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), which allowed a federal court to decide a purely state
law issue concerning the redemption of municipal bonds. The Meredith case was arguably
a reaction against the use of abstention by the federal courts to avoid decisions on difficult
state issues. Thus, the Florida certification statute was designed to be consistent with the
theory behind the abstention doctrine and yet not violate the Meredith principle that the
mere difficulty of ascertaining local law in a diversity suit is insufficient to order abstention.
Roth, supra, at 6-7.
35. Comment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means
and Confusion of Goals", 73 YALE L.J. 850, 866-69 (1964).
36. See supra note 17.
37. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417.
38. 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, at 162-63.
39. Id. at 163.
40. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
41. Id. at 391.
42. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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consent statute. 43 The Court found that the district court should have
certified questions concerning the meaning of the statute and the pro
cedures it imposed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 44
The Bellotti Court stated:
It is sufficient that the statute is susceptible of the interpretation
offered by appellants . . . and that such an interpretation would
avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to
the statute, as it clearly would. Indeed, in the absence of an author-"
itative construction, it is impossible to define precisely the constitu
.tional question presented.4S

The Court further noted that although abstention would be proper in
this case were certification unavailable, "the availability of certification
greatly simplifies the analysis."46
The most recent Supreme Court case to invoke a state certifica
tion procedure was Virginia v. American Booksellers Association. 47 A
1985 amendment to the Virginia statutes made it unlawful "to know
ingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles
may examine and peruse" sexually explicit visual or written material
which is "harmful to juveniles."48 The previously existing statute only
43. Id. at 133-34. The statute provided in part:
[When Ii woman seeks an abortion, if she] is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If
one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent [for the abortion]
may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown,
after such hearing as he deems necessary.
Id. at 134-35 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West 1974) (current ver
sion at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 12S (1990»).
44. Id. at 151. At the district court level, a divided three judge panel held that ins0
far as the Massachusetts statute created a parental veto over a minor's decision to obtain an
abortion, the statute violated the fourteenth amendment. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp.
847, 855-56 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The dissenting judge argued
that because the Massachusetts statute expressly provided that the parents' refusal to con
sent was not final, state courts could make the final determination. Therefore, the dissent
reasoned, if the state court found that a minor was mature enough to give an informed
consent, the court would enter the necessary order permitting her to exercise her constitu
tional right to an abortion despite the fact that her parents had refused their consent. Id. at
864.
45. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 148.
46. Id. at 151. The Massachusetts certification procedure is available through Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 1:03, 382 Mass. 700 (1981) (formerly Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:21, 359
Mass. 790 (1971». See Wilkins, Certification of Questions of Law: The Massachusetts Ex
perience, 74 MASS. L. REV. 256, 256 nn.I-2 (1989).
47. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
48. Id. at 386 (quoting VA. CoDE § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1987»; see also Note, When
Concepts Collide: Display Provisions and the First Amendment, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REv.
133 (1988) (discussing American Booksellers Ass'n).
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prohibited the sale of such materials to juveniles.49
The American Booksellers Association brought suit challenging
the amendment's constitutionality. The Association argued that the
amendment restricted access to adults because of the economically
bUrdensome and restrictive measures booksellers would have to adopt
to comply with the statute. 50 The Association also argued that the
amendment was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted ac
cess by mature juveniles to works that were harmful only to younger
juveniles. 51 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment was un
constitutionally vague because it would be impossible to determine
what standard to use in deciding whether a particular work was suita
ble for juveniles of ditfering ages and maturity levels. 52
The Virginia Attorney General argued that the 1985 amendment
extended only to "borderline obscenity" and that booksellers could
comply with the statute by tagging the restricted materials or by plac
ing them behind "blinder racks."s3 Thus, the Attorney General ar
gued that the statute had no "significant 'spillover' effect on adults. "54
Declining to abstain,55 the federal district court held that the stat
ute was unconstitutionally overbroad and permanently enjoined its en
forcement. 56 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 57
The state appealed, alleging a conflict among the courts of appeals
since the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had upheld similar statutes. S8
The Supreme Court in American Booksellers Association held that
it should not attempt to decide the constitutional issues without first
having the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute and,
therefore, it certified two questions. 59 The. Court based its decision to
49.

American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 386-87.

50. Id. at 388-89. Specifically, the booksellers argued that compliance would require
a bookseller to create an "adults only" section of the store, place the covered works behind
the counter, decline to carry the materials in question or bar juveniles from the store. Id. at
389.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 389-90.
53. Id. at 390. Blinder racks hold magazines and books and display only the title of
the work.
54. Id.
55. Virginia's certification procedure was not available to the lower courts since it
only became effective on April 1, 1987. Id. at 386.
56. Id. at 391. The district court adopted the plaintiff's theory as to the scope of the
statute and rejected the Attorney General's suggestion for compliance. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 392 (citing Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780
F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983»; see
also Note, supra note 48.
59. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 393. The Supreme Court certified two
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certify on the unusual supposition that the state would decline to de
fend the statute if its scope were as broad as the booksellers asserted. 60
Furthermore, since the statute would remain enjoined during the certi
fication process, the Court reasoned that "[i]n these circumstances,
there is some advantage and no cost, either in terms of the first amend
ment chilling effect or unnecessary delay, to certifying a proffered nar
rowing construction that is neither inevitable nor impossible."61
The Court proceeded to say that in considering a facial challenge
to a statute, a federal court should uphold the statute if it is "readily
susceptible" to a narrowing construction that would render it constitu
tional. 62 The unusual circumstances in American Booksellers Associa
tion,63 however, prevented the Court from having to determine
whether the Virginia statute was readily susceptible to a narrowing
construction because the Court chose to certify on the basis that there
was nothing to risk and much to gain.64 .
This "readily susceptible" test for determining the facial validity
of a statute derived from the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. 6s
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited American
Booksellers Association and other overbreadth cases as support for the
proposition that the test for certification is whether a statute is readily
susceptible to a narrowing construction. 66 Consequently, it appears as
questions to the Virginia Supreme Court. First, the Court asked if the phrase "harmful to
juveniles" encompassed any of the plaintiff's exhibits, and what general standard should be
used to determine the statute's reach in light of differing ages and maturity levels of
juveniles. Second, the Court asked whether a bookseller could comply with the statute by
prohibiting juveniles from examining harmful materials when observed, but otherwise tak
ing no action. If compliance was not met, the Court then asked whether booksellers could
comply with the statute by announcing the store's policy to the public. Id. at 398.
60. Id. at 394-95.
61. Id. at 397.
62. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973».
63. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
64. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 397.
The Virginia Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the negative. The
result was that none of the plaintiff's exhibits were "harmful to juveniles" under the stat
ute. The court answered the second certified question in the affirmative. Thus, a bookseller
could comply with the statute by prohibiting juveniles from perusing the harmful materials
when observed without taking additional action. Commonwealth v. American Booksellers
Ass'n, 236 Va. 168, 372 S.E.ld 618 (1988).
Upon receiving these answers to the certified questions, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the amendment to the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989).
65. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). See infra notes 67-78 for a
discussion of the relationship between the overbreadth doctrine and certification.
66. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432,435 (ld Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450
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if some federal judges consider the tests for certification and facial in
validation due to overbreadth to be the same.
C.

The Overbreadth Doctrine and Certification

A first amendment overbreadth challenge in federal court is one
example of a situation where a federal court may be asked to review
the constitutionality of a state statute before that statute has been con
strued by a state court. Under the first amendment overbreadth doc
trine, a federal court may invalidate an allegedly overbroad statute on
its face. That is, a federal court may forbid enforcement of the statute
so as to remove the threat or deterrence to protected expression. 67
The Supreme Court labelled the use of the overbreadth doctrine
"strong medicine"68 and recognized that "[i]t remains a 'matter of no
little difficulty' to determine when a law may be properly held void on
its face and when 'such summary action' is inappropriate."69
A federal court must balance the possible deterrence of protected
activity with a state's right to regulate conduct that is "within its
power to proscribe. "70 The Supreme Court uses a two part test to
determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. First, "a
law should not be invalidated . . . unless it reaches a substantial
number of impermissible applications."71 Second, the court should
(1989) (citing American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 397; Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
148 (1976); Ermoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973».
67. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768
(1982). In Ferber, the Court explained that "[t]he [overbreadth] doctrine is predicated on
the sensitive nature of protected expression: 'persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a
statute susceptible of application to protected expression.''' Id. (citing Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972». For a detailed discussion of the overbreadth doctrine,
see generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Redish, The Warren Court.
the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031
(1983).
68. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
69. Id. at 615 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971) (opin
ion of Black, J.».
70. Id. (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969»; see also
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
71. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, where the Court
explained:
Although . . . laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some
unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibit
ing a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its
power to proscribe.
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not invalidate a statute if it is readily susceptible to a limiting con
struction which removes the threat or deterrence to protected
expression. 72
The obvious relationship between certification and overbreadth is
that to determine whether a statute violates constitutional standards
because it is substantially overbroad, a court must first determine what
that statute means. 73 Certification, as a method of ascertaining an au
thoritative interpretation of state law, may avoid or substantially mod
ify the constitutional challenge to the statute. 74 An overbreadth
challenge to an unconstrued state statute presents a peculiar problem
because the tests for certification and overbreadth are almost identical
since both tests require a determination of whether the statute is sub
ject to a narrowing construction. If a federal court does not certify
questions concerning the meaning of the unconstrued state statute, it
risks invalidating a state statute based upon an erroneous interpreta
tion of state law. If, however, a federal court considers certification, it
risks determining the merits of the state law issue in. its attempt to
determine whether it should certify that issue to the state court.7S
This is because the test for certification - whether a statute is readily
susceptible to a narrowing construction - is the same as part two of
the test for overbreadth.
Virginia v. American Booksellers Association 76 and Bellotti v.
Baird 77 show the logic of first defining the constitutional issue with an
authoritative construction of the statute before proceeding to the mer
its of the federal constitutional question. Recently, in Dorman v.
Satti,78 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to appreci
ate this logic and arguably determined the scope of the state statute in
an attempt to determine whether it should certify that issue to the
Connecticut Supreme Court.
Id.
72. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
73. An overbreadth analysis necessarily requires construction of the statute in ques·
tion in order to assess its scope. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508
09 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484
U.S. 383, 399 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Ste
vens, in dissenting from the Court's refusal to modify a certified question, stated "an an
swer to the question I would ask would be of great help in understanding the reach of the
statute and evaluating its validity.").
74. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 396.
75. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
76. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
77. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
78. 862 F.2d 432·(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989).
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DORMAN V. SAITI 79

The Facts

In 1985, the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute which pro
hibited interference with the lawful taking of wildlife (the "Hunter
statute").80 The statute also prohibited the harassment of a person
engaged in or in the preparation of lawful hunting. 81 Violation of the
Act was a class C misdemeanor, which could lead "to a fine and/or
imprisonment for up to three months. "82
Francelle Dorman was arrested under the Act when she ap
proached several hunters and attempted to dissuade them from their
plans to hunt geese. 83 Although the chief prosecutor dismissed the
charges against Dorman, she filed suit in federal district court, seeking
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the statute. 84 She alleged
that her actual arrest and the threat of future enforcement of the Act
violated her first and fourteenth amendment rights. 8s

B.

The District Court Decision

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court inval
idated the Connecticut statute on the ground that since the Act failed
to define what conduct constituted interference or harassment, the
statute's language was impermissibly vague and overbroad. 86 Simi
larly, the court found that the statute was unconstitutionally over
broad because it failed to limit, as to time and place, "acts in
preparation" of lawful hunting. 87
C.

The Court of Appeals Decision
1.

The Majority

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
Chief Prosecutor argued that construction of the terms "interfere,"
"harass," and "acts in preparation" should be certified to the Connect
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 433 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985».
Id.
Id.
Id. at 434.
84. Id. The state prosecutor dismissed the charges, conceding that Dorman's arrest
was premature since she only talked about what she was going to do to interfere with the
hunting of the geese. Id.
85. Id.
86. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 383-84 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989).
87. Id. at 382.
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icut Supreme Court because that court had not had the opportunity to
construe the statutory language. 88 The Chief Prosecutor also appealed
on the merits. 89
The court of appeals in Dorman declined to invoke Connecticut's
certification procedure90 and affirmed the district court's decision to
invalidate the Connecticut statute. 91 The Second Circuit acknowl
edged that the Supreme Court encouraged the use of state certification
procedures as an alternative to abstention,92 and recognized that certi
fication may further the interests of federaVstate comity.93 Neverthe
less, the Second Circuit said that "issues of state law 'are not to be
88. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434-45 (2d Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct.
2450 (1989).
89. Id. at 434.
90. Connecticut's certification statute reads:
(a) This section may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act.
(b) The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States or a
United States district court when requested by the certifying court if there are
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it
appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the supreme court of this state.
(c) This section may be invoked by an order of any of the courts referred to
in subsection (b) of this section upon the court's own motion or upon the motion
of any party to the cause.
(d) A certification order shall set forth: (1) The questions of law to be an
swered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and
showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.
(e) The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed
by the judge presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the supreme court by the
clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The supreme court may require
the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certifying
court to be filed with the certification order, if, in the opinion of the supreme
court, the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions.
(f) Fees and costs shall be the same as in civil appeals docketed before the
supreme court and shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise
ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification.
(g) Proceedings in the supreme court shall be those provided in the rules of
said court.
(h) The written opinion of the supreme court stating the law governing the
questions certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the supreme court to
the certifying court and to the parties.
(i) This section shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199a (1989).
91. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437.
92. Id. at 434 (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 396
(1988».
93. Id. at 434-35.
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routinely certified ... simply because a certification procedure is avail
able. The procedure must not be a device for shifting the burdens of
this Court to those whose burdens are at least as great.' "94
According to the Second Circuit, the test for determining the ne
cessity of certification is whether the statute in question is readily sus
ceptible to a narrowing construction that would render it
constitutional.9S In determining that the Connecticut statute was not
readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, the court of appeals
distinguished Dorman from State v. Williams,96 in which the Connect
icut Supreme Court upheld a similar statute.
In Williams, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a state law
making it a crime to interfere with police officers or firefighters in the
performance of their duties. 97 That statute defines interference as ob
structing, resisting, hindering or endangering a police officer or
firefighter "in the performance of his duties."98 The Connecticut
Supreme Court upheld the statute by limiting its application to inten
tional interference. 99
. Both the Second Circuit in Dorman and the Connecticut
Supreme Court distinguished the statute in Williams from a similar
ordinance which the United States Supreme Court struck down in
City ofHouston v. HiII.loo The ordinance in Hill declared it "unlawful
for any person to ... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt
any policeman in the execution of his duty."101 The United States
Supreme Court held that the Houston ordinance was unambiguous
and not easily susceptible to a limiting construction because it was not
drawn so narrowly as to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting
words, which may be constitutionally proscribed.102 In declining to
94.

Id. at 435 (quoting Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir.

1987».
96.
97.

95.

Id. (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988».
205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230 (1987).
Id. at 467, 534 A.2d at 236 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a (1971».

98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 474, 534 A.2d at 239. The court explained that the definition of "interfer

ing" had been construed to include only intentional conduct:
By its terms, § 53a-167a is directed only at conduct that interferes with police and
firemen in the performance of their duties. As we have said earlier, it encom
passes only interference that is intentional. This limiting construction, which we
deem to be fully consistent with the intent of the legislature, preserves the stat
ute's purpose to proscribe "core criminal conduct" that is not constitutionally
protected.
Id. at 473-74, 534 A.2d at 239 (citation and footnote omitted).
100. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
101. Id. at 461.
102. Id. at 462, 465. The Court noted that the language would "prohibit[] verbal
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certify because the statute was not readily susceptible to a narrowing
construction, the Hill Court noted that "[a] federal court may not
properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a
statute."103
Comparing the Connecticut Hunter statute to the statutes in Wi/
liams and Hill, the Second Circuit likened the Hunter statute to the
ordinance in Hill. The court of appeals said that "because the [Con
necticut Hunter] Act fails to define the nature of the interference it
proscribes, its language implicitly sweeps as broadly as that of the
Houston ordinance, and it thus cannot be saved by a limiting construc
tion as was Section 53a-167a" in WiIliams. 104
Consequently, the Dorman court held that although the parties
offered conflicting interpretations of the Connecticut statute, "the
Connecticut court would be in no better position than a federal court
to decide which interpretation is correct. This is because ... the stat
ute ... is so imprecise and indefinite that it is subject to any number of
interpretations."lOs To ask the Connecticut Supreme Court to con
sider construing the statute more narrowly, such as applying only to
"core criminal conduct," would, according to the court of appeals, "be
tantamount to asking the Connecticut court 'if it would care in effect
to rewrite [the] statute.' "106
With this observation, the Second Circuit in Dorman illustrated
the second major problem with the "readily susceptible" test. Federal
courts often say that a particular statute is not subject to a narrowing
construction because to construe the language more narrowly would
result in a rewriting of the statute. 107 How to tell the difference be
tween narrowly construing and rewriting a statute remains a mystery.
interruptions of police officers." Id. at 461. But see id. at 473-75 (powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the ordinance was ambiguous enough to warrant
certification).
103. Id. at 471; see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. But see Williams, 205
Conn. at 473, 534 A.2d at 239 (Unlike the United States Supreme Court, a state supreme
court has the power to construe state statutes narrowly to comport with constitutional
standards.).
104. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 435 (quoting Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375,
381-82 (D. Conn. 1988», cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989).
105. Id. at 436. The court of appeals, however, overlooked the fact that a state court
construction of state law is, though perhaps incorrect, the authoritative interpretation.
Furthermore, the purpose of certification is to allow a state court to provide an authorita
tive interpretation. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471
(1987».
107. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); City of
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216 n.15 (1975); Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436.
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Moreover, the dissenting opinion in Dorman did not agree with the
majority's interpretation of the statute's scope.
2.

The Dissent

Judge Miner filed a dissenting opinion in Dorman, in which he
argued in favor of certification. Judge Miner thought that the statu
tory terms "interfere," "harass," and "acts in preparation" were sus
ceptible to a limiting state court construction. lOS •
First, unlike the majority, Judge Miner was unable to distinguish
the Connecticut statute from that in Wil/iams. 109 According to Judge
Miner, hunting activities could be substituted for police duties so that
the Hunter statute would confine proscribed conduct to meddling or
hampering in hunting activities. llo Second, Connecticut law affords a
restrictive definition of "harassment" in its telephone harassment stat
ute, which requires evidence of an intention to annoy or alarm another
person. II I Thus, Judge Miner argued that there is no reason why the
Connecticut Supreme Court could not d~fine harassment in the con
text of the Hunter statute without impinging on the first amend
ment. 1I2 Third, Judge Miner argued that a narrowing construction
could limit "acts in preparation" to preparatory acts "directly, un
equivocally and immediately related to the act of taking wildlife." I \3
In addition, Judge Miner concluded that the Connecticut sever
ability statute,114 which allows the Connecticut Supreme Court to ex
cise invalid portions of state statutes without affecting the valid
remainder, shows that the Hunter statute is "subject to pruning by the
Connecticut Supreme Court."IIS
Finally, in apparent recognition of the difficulty inherent in ap
plying the readily susceptible test, Judge Miner compared the Con
necticut Hunter statute to the statute in Virginia v. American
Booksellers Association 116 and concluded:
If the term "harmful to juveniles," as defined in a Virginia statute
prohibiting the display of certain visual or written materials, is con
sidered subject to a narrowing construction by the Virginia Supreme
108. See Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting).
109. Id. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams.
110. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting).
Ill. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (1987».
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-3 (1989).
115. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting).
116. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
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Court after certification, then the objectionable terms in the Con
necticut Hunter Harassment Act certainly should be capable of the
sort of limiting construction that would meet constitutional
challenges. 1 17

The fundamental disagreement over the susceptibility of the Con
necticut Hunter statute to a saving construction shows the weakness of
the "readily susceptible" test for certification. The "readily suscepti
ble" standard invites disagreement because it is unclear how to tell
when, or if, a narrowing construction becomes a rewriting of the stat
ute. More importantly, the result in Dorman also demonstrates how
easy it is for a federal court to invalidate an unconstrued state law.

III.

ANALYSIS

Federal courts invoke certification procedures to redress the diffi
culties of abstention. 1IS Certification shares with abstention the objec
tives of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication and
preventing unnecessary interference with state policy.l19 The issue for
federal courts is to determine the necessity of federal court interfer
ence with state legislative policy. In other words, should a federal
court certify first or should it invalidate the unconstrued state law on
its face? The Dorman decision shows how easy it is for a federal court
to pay only lip service to important federalism interests and still invali
date an unconstrued state law po
The Second Circuit's application of the "readily susceptible" test
in Dorman illustrates the two problems with the standard. First, the
test encourages federal courts to rule on the merits of the constitu
tional validity of a state statute, thereby failing to serve the federal
interest of deference to state court interpretation of state law. Second,
when determining whether a state statute is readily susceptible to a
limiting construction, federal courts attempt to distinguish between
narrowly construing and rewriting the statute. This distinction is diffi
cult, if not impossible to make.
Application of the "readily susceptible" standard fails to serve the
117. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
118. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417. See supra notes 29-39 and accompany
ing text for a discussion of the development of certification.
119. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417 n.27 (citing Note, Interjurisdictional
Cenification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, III U. PA. L.
REv. 344,350 (1963); see also Field, supra note 17, at 590.
120. Before invalidating the Connecticut Hunter statute, the Second Circuit restated
the federalism interests that certification is designed to further. See supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
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federalism interests upon which certification rests because federal
courts, rather than state courts, determine the susceptibility of state
law to a state court's narrowing construction. Thus, despite the avail
ability of a means for ascertaining an authoritative interpretation of
state law, federal courts routinely are able to invalidate unconstrued
state statutes. This threat to federalism should be cause for concern as
federal court litigation of state issues increases. 121
A.

The "Readily Susceptible" Test Encourages a Decision on the
Merits

.The "readily susceptible" test for certification invites a federal
court to predict whether a state court could narrowly construe a state
statute to save it from constitutional attack. In making such a predic
tion, a federal court must anticipate somewhat the merits of the consti
tutional question. 122
The Second Circuit's analysis in Dorman illustrates that its deci
sion not to certify the meaning of the key terms in the Hunter statute
was a function of its determination that the language was unconstitu
tionally overbroad. In Section II of the court's opinion, entitled "The
Merits," the court stated that when considering a facial challenge to
an allegedly vague and overbroad statute, "a court's first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of con
stitutionally protected conduct."123 The answer to this question nec
essarily requires knowledge of the meaning and scope of the statute in
question. The majority, however, had already decided in its previous
section, where it addressed the question of whether to certify, that the
language of the Hunter statute was as broad as that of the ordinance in
City of Houston v. Hill.124
Essentially, the Dorman court decided the merits of the constitu
tional validity of the Connecticut Hunter statute when it decided not
121. "As the willingness of federal courts to relax the rules of standing and to strike
down ordinances in their entirety increases, so also does the incentive to prosecute in the
federal courts." Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1986) (Higginbot
ham, J., dissenting), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
122. See Field, supra note 16, at 1109. Professor Field observes that to some extent a
federal court must address the merits of state issues in order to make an abstention decision
since the court should .only abstain when state law is unclear. Id. Arguably, this point
extends to certification, which like abstention, is only proper when state law is unclear.
123. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432,436 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982», cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 2450 (1989).
124. Id. at 435. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text for the court's com
parison of the Connecticut statute to the ordinance in Hill.
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to certify questions of state law to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
This evaluation of the merits stems from the test for certification
which asks a federal court to determine whether a state statute is read
ily susceptible to a state court narrowing construction.
The court's analysis in Dorman shows that the test for certifica
tion in an overbreadth context is directed at the wrong court. A first
amendment overbreadth analysis necessarily requires an assessment of
the statute's SCOpe.125. Nevertheless, federalism requires that federal
courts abstain from deciding constitutional questions which are en
twined with a state law issue so that state courts can provide authori
tative interpretations of state law. 126 The issue of whether a statute is
readily susceptible to a state court limiting construction is best left to
state courts to decide as they are more familiar with the entire body of
state law and may have more expertise in the understanding and con
struction of state legislative intent.127 If a federal court can predict
how a state court might interpret state law, a state is left with little
remedy for an erroneous federal court construction of state law. 128
Furthermore, the availability of certification in most states removes
the need for a federal court to predict the scope of a state law. 129
B.

Narrowing Versus Rewriting

A corollary to the "readily susceptible" standard is that a nar
rowing construction must not be a rewriting of the statute. In City of
Houston v. HiIl,13° the Supreme Court stated that "[a] federal court
may not properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a
statute."l3l The Court provided no support for this rule.
While a federal court may not provide a narrowing construction
for state legislation,132 this limitation on federal court power does not
125. See supra note 73.
126. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
127. Comment, supra note 35, at 867.
128. See supra note 16.
129. "Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the ab
sence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when ... state courts stand
willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court." Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,510 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Bel
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (observing that the availability of certification "helps
build a cooperative judicial federalism" (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974»).
130. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
131. Id. at 471.
132. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,397 (1988) (The Supreme
Court "will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. "); see also
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (Federal courts "lack jurisdiction authorita
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preclude a state court from interpreting state law within constitutional
boundaries. In State v. Williams,133 the Connecticut Supreme Court
said that "unlike the United States Supreme Court, this court has the
power to construe state statutes narrowly to comport with the consti
tutional right of free speech."134 In addition, the Connecticut
Supreme Court said in Moscone v. Manson 135 that:
It is ... true that this court will not ordinarily construe a statute

whose meaning is plain and unambiguous. This rule of statutory
construction does not apply however if ... a literal reading places a
statute in constitutional jeopardy. We are bound to assume that the
legislature intended, in enacting a particular law, to achieve its pur
pose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional. 136

As Judge Miner noted in Dorman, Connecticut's severability law is
further evidence of the state's power to confine state laws to their
proper scope. 137
Given that state courts have the power to interpret state laws and
to confine them within the constitutional scope, federal courts cannot
distinguish between a narrowing construction and a rewriting of the
law. Federal courts cannot even agree on when a state statute is am
biguous enough to warrant certification or abstention. 138 Addition
tively to construe state legislation." (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971»).
133. 205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230 (1987).
134. Id. at 473, 534 A.2d at 239 (citing Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130-31,
440 A.2d 848 (1981); Engle v. Personnel Appeal Bd., 175 Conn. 127, 134, 394 A.2d 731
(1978».
135. 185 Conn. 124, 440 A.2d 848 (1981).
136. Id. at 128,440 A.2d at 851 (citations omitted).
137. Donnan v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1988) (Miner, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of Connecticut's sever
ability statute.
138. See supra notes 88-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differing
opinions on the certification issue in Dorman. Three other illustrations are relevant.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented
from the majority's decision not to certify in City of Houston v. Hill. See 482 U.S. 451,
473-75 (1987) (powell, J., dissenting). See supra notes l00-OJ for a brief discussion of Hill.
Justice Powell wrote that the ordinance, which prohibited anyone from opposing or inter
rupting a police officer in the execution of his duty, was ambiguous because it lacked an
explicit intent requirement, while the Texas Penal Code mandated "imputation of some
culpability requirement." Hill, 482 U.S. at 473 (powell, J., dissenting). Similarly, at the
appellate level, seven judges of a fifteen-member panel dissented from the majority's facial
invalidation of the ordinance:
Although the ordinance on its face may be susceptible to ttoubling construc
tions, it need not be so construed. The state courts could, for example, easily find
an intent requirement in the ordinance .... Similarly, the ordinance need not be
construed as applicable to all police functions .... It certainly could be limited to
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ally, if a federal court cannot consistently determine whether a statute
is clear or unclear, then it cannot proceed further to make the determi
nation that a limiting construction is really a rewriting of the statlawful police functions, so that public challenges to unauthorized police activities
would be unaffected.
Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
Likewise, disagreement over the meaning of a Washington state moral nuisance law
produced a plurality opinion in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
The statute declared any place that exhibits lewd films as a regular course of business to be
a moral nuisance. According to the statute, " 'lewd matter' is synonymous with 'obscene
matter.''' Id. at 493 (quoting WASH. REv. CoDE § 7.48A.020(2) (1983». ObsCene matter
was further defined to include any matter which" 'appeals to the prurient interest.''' Id.
The statute also defined prurient as " 'that which incites lasciviousness or lust.''' Id. at 494
(quoting WASH. REv. CoDE § 7.48A.OI0(8) (1983». The plurality reversed the lower
court's complete facial invalidation and partially invalidated the law "insofar as the word
lust was taken to include a normal interest in sex." Id. at 504-05. However, in her concur
ring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
noted that the Court should have abstained or certified to allow the state courts the oppor
tunity to construe the Washington law. Id. at 507-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor wrote:
The Court of Appeals opined that the Washington statute is not susceptible
to a limiting construction .... This assertion is simply implausible.... Both the
text and the background of the Washington statute indicate that the state legisla
ture sought to conform the moral nuisance law to the constitutional standards
outlined by this Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Moreover, the
state courts have demonstrated their willingness to construe state obscenity laws
in accord with Miller.
Id. at 509 (citations omitted). For a complete discussion of Brockett, see Note, Federal
Court Interpretation of the Washington Obscenity Statute-Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985),61 WASH. L. REV. 1237 (1986).
Finally, even the most seemingly unambiguous statute may produce disagreement.
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The Court in Constantineau facially
invalidated a Wisconsin law which provided that certain persons could post a notice in
retail liquor stores prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to persons who, through ex
cessive drinking, posed a danger to the community. Id. at 434. Since the statute contained
no provision for notice or hearing, the Court held that the law was unambiguous and vio
lated due process rights. Id. at 436-39. Despite the .1ack of notice and/or hearing provi
sions, three justices dissented, arguing that the Court should have abstained to allow the
Wisconsin courts to interpret the law. In one of the two dissenting opinions, Justice Black,
joined by Justice Blackmun, noted that "[i]t seems ... wholly uncertain that the state law
has the meaning it purports to have." Id. at 444 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
explained:
[I]t is unfair to Wisconsin to permit its courts to be denied the opportunity of
confining this law within its proper limits if it could be shown that there are other
state law provisions that could provide such boundaries. For example, notice and
hearing might be provided by principles of state administrative procedure law
similar to the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Id.
These cases illustrate the diverse spectrum of federal court interpretation of state law.
The various opinions suggest that federal courts cannot consistently distinguish between a
narrowing construction or a rewriting of a state law, since they cannot agree on what
makes a statute ambiguous enough to warrant a state court construction in the first place.
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ute.139 Furthermore, to focus on this seemingly empty distinction is to
move further away from the essential purpose of certification.
The purpose of certification is to provide state courts with the
opportunity to rule on an issue of state law before a federal court ren
ders a decision based upon an interpretation contrary to how the
state's highest court would interpret the statute in question. l40 Ob
taining an authoritative interpretation on a state law question allows a
federal court to make a more accurate determination about the valid
ity of the state law. 141 Considering the availability of certification pro
cedures, federal courts should allow the state's highest court to render
its interpretation of a state statute before a federal court invalidates it
on its face. 142
If federal courts are serious about recognizing state independence

and maintaining an efficient federal judiciary, 143 they must realize the
failings of the current test for certification in the facial overbreadth
context and develop a test that better serves the purpose of
certification.
139. In fact, when the Supreme Court holds that a court may not rewrite a state
statute, it does not offer any standard for knowing when a judicial interpretation is actually
a rewriting of the law. See, e.g., Hill, 482 U.S. at 471; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 216 n.15 (1975). Perhaps this is because any interpretation may be an
amendment to the statute insofar as the construction adds a new or different meaning to the
statutory language.
140. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 434-35.
141. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). In this abstention case, the
Supreme Court said:
All we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to state construction or
limiting interpretation before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their
constitutionality, so that federal judgment will be based on something that is a
complete product of the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as
construed by its highest court.
Id. at 178.
142. A federal court need not accept a narrowing construction which is inconsistent
with prior applications of the law. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969). However, where there is no prior application of the law, as in a facial overbreadth
challenge to an unconstrued state statute, a federal court ought to ground its overbreadth
determination on an accurate state court interpretation. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 475 (powell,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he ambiguity of the ordinance, coupled with the seriousness of invali
dating a state law, requires that we ascertain what the ordinance means before we address
appellee's constitutional claims."); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a
state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when
. . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a
federal court. ").
143. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Dorman, 862 F.2d
at 434-35.
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Proposal

The seriousness of federal court invalidation of state policy re
quires an authoritative interpretation of a state statute prior to a fed
eral court invalidation of that statute. Therefore, this Note proposes
that when federal courts review a facial overbreadth challenge to an
unconstrued state statute, they seriously consider certification prior to
a facial invalidation to ensure that any resulting interference with state
policy is necessary and not premature. Federal courts should reflect
upon the problems that occur when they fail to invoke available certifi
cation procedures.
Certification is clearly beneficial in the case of an ambiguous state
statute, but considering that certification produces some additional ex
pense and delay, it might appear desirable to allow a federal court to
quickly invalidate an unambiguous state statute even in the absence of
prior state court adjudication. The problem with such an assumption
is that federal courts are inconsistent in determining when a state law
issue is unclear enough to warrant abstention or certification.l44 Fur
thermore, in a first amendment overbreadth challenge, the clarity of
the statute in question is of critical importance since the analysis fo
cuses on the scope of the law as it relates to protected expression. 145
The importance of obtaining an accurate construction of the state stat
ute suggests that federal courts should certify before prescribing the
"strong medicine" 146 of facial invalidation. The Dorman court noted
that certification should not be a device for shifting federal court bur
dens to state courtS. 147 The Second Circuit's concern over the state
court's docket is misplaced in the context of a facial overbreadth chal
lenge to an unconstrued state statute. As the court of appeals admit
ted, a state court's interest .in accepting questions for review is
"particularly strong when it has not yet had the opportunity to inter
pret the pertinent statutory language." 148
Furthermore, state certification statutes limit the type of ques
tions that the states' highest courts will accept, so that state courts
144. "Where there is no ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court should not
abstain but should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim." Wisconsin v. Con
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250-51
(1967». The Court, however, is unable to consistently determine when a statute is ambigu
ous. See supra note 138.
145. See supra note 73.
146. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
147. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435.
148. Id.
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have the discretionary power to decline to answer certain questions. 149
These state statutory limits on certification should encourage federal
courts to refrain from certifying questions which do not satisfy the
minimal requirements of state certification statutes.l so Obviously, a
federal court should not certify questions it knows the state will refuse
to accept. If there is any doubt, however, a federal court should cer
tify and allow the state court the opportunity to accept or decline to
answer. A state court which declines to answer a certified question
should be estopped from arguing premature interference with state
policy.
Certification before facial invalidation will further the principles
of federalism which warn against unnecessary interference with state
policy and unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. It
will not, however, protect against the chilling effect when constitu
tional rights are potentially at stake. lSI Consequently, interim relief
during the certification process may be necessary.
If the alternative would be facial invalidation of an unconstrued
state statute because the fear of a chilling effect during the certification
process is too great, a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the challenged state statute is a possible solution for alleviating any
potential chilling effect. IS2 A preliminary injunction serves to protect
149. Connecticut's certification statute limits certified questions to those that "may
be determinative of the cause then pending ... and as to which it appears to the certifying
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court ofth[e] state."
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199a(b) (1989). Most state certification statutes have similar lim
iting language.
Challenges to unconstrued state statutes necessarily satisfy the second requirement
that state supreme court precedent is lacking. The requirement that the state law issue
might be determinative of the case is more problematic and is one reason why state courts
have declined to answer certified questions. See, e.g., Joseph v. Pima County, 158 Ariz.
250,251,762 P.2d 537, 538 (1988) (Non-diversity litigants should not first remove cases to
federal court only to ask for certification of state law questions.); White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d
668, 677 (Me. 1974) (question of state law must be "susceptible of an answer ... [which]
will produce a final disposition of the federal case"); Grant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 235 Mont. 1, 3, 775 P.2d 684, 685 (1988) ("[L]itigation may be settled
solely on questions offederallaw."); Schlieter v. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 509, 775 P.2d 709,
711 (1989) (questions certified not accompanied by sufficient JIlonhypothetical, evidentiary
facts to evaluate constitutionality of state statute); Retail Software Servs. v. Lashlee, 71
N.Y.2d 788, 790, 525 N.E.2d 737, 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1988) (answer to a certified
question which would establish an abstract proposition would not satisfy the constitutional
requirement that the question may be determinative of the pending action); Hachney v.
Steighner, 549 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976) (certified answer must dispose of the case one
way or another).
150. See 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 4248, at 171
(1988).
151. See supra note 3 for an explanation of the "chilling effect."
152. Technically, a preliminary injunction only protects the particular federal plain
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the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the status quo un
til the federal court renders a meaningful decision following a trial on
the merits.1S3
While interim relief may preserve the status quo and alleviate any
chilling effect during the certification process, it also conflicts to some
extent with the policies on which certification rests. IS4 First, interim
relief necessarily interferes with state policy. ISS Second, a grant of in
terim relief does not avoid the constitutional question since the deci
sion to grant a preliminary injunction rests in part on a judicial
evaluation of the merits.IS6 Third, because the federal court must in
quire into the merits, the state court may take the preliminary deter
mination as an indication of how the federal court will ultimately rule
on the merits and may view the injunction as an attempt to force the
state court into interpreting the state law in 'accordance with the fed
eral court's preliminary determination. ls7
Interim relief in the certification context poses a problem due to
the requirement of a showing that the moving party is likely to suc
ceed on the merits. ISS Just as it is undesirable for a federal court to
address the merits of the state law issue prior to certification,ls9 it is
similarly undesirable for a federal court to address the merits of the
case to determine whether to grant interim relief.l60 Consequently,
certification in situations involving facial overbreadth challenges to
tiffs since the state is free to prosecute others who violate the contested statute. See Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). Consequently, a temporary stay may not
afford all potential plaintiffs with sufficient protection. However, if the plaintiff represents a
class of people in a class action challenge to the contested statute, then a preliminary in
junction would prohibit enforcement of the statute against all people in the particular class.
Even if the plaintiff does not represent a class, the pending suit may encourage the state
, prosecutor to wait for the final disposition before attempting further prosecutions under the
challenged law.
153. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2947,
at 423 (1973); see also Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 173, 174 (1984).
154. Wells, Preliminary Injunctions and Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism,
63 CoRNELL L. REv. 65, 75 (1977).

ISS.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.

158. The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires a show
ing that 1) in the absence of interim relief, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury and 2)
that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931 (1975). For a detailed history of the standards for granting interim relief, see generally
Leubsdorf, The Standard/or Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978); Wolf,
supra note 153.
159. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
160. See Wolf, supra note 153, at 230-33.
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unconstrued state statutes is one area where federal courts should not
focus on the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits and should
apply an alternative standard. 161
One possibility is to completely ignore the merits and balance the
relative hardships to the opposing parties. 162 Under this standard the
court could determine whether to grant interim relief based' on its
analysis of the severity of the potential chilling effect and the compet
ing state interest in enforcing the particular regulation. Alternatively,
rather than completely ignoring the merits, a federal court could apply
one of the less rigorous tests which asks whether the plaintiff raises a
serious question regarding the merits. 163 If the federal court applies
either of these alternative approaches that permit interim relief with
out a showing that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits, it will
preserve the status quo and the principles of federalism by allowing
state courts to rule on the state law issue.
Even if the traditional "likelihood of success on the merits" stan
dard is used to determine preliminary relief and federalism principles
are violated, a grant of interim relief causes a less serious disruption of
a state program than does a refusal to certify.t 64 The preliminary in
161. A departure from relying on the moving party's likelihood of prevailing on the
merits is not without support. Some courts follow a less rigorous standard, which while
still looking at the merits, does not require a showing that the moving party is likely to
prevail. See. e.g., Dataphase Sys. v. C L Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) ("(W]here
the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward movant a preliminary injunction may
issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate
investigation."); National Ass'n of Farmworkers Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604,616 n.52
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("An order maintaining the status quo is appropriate when a serious legal
question is presented ...." (quoting Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday
Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977»); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood &
Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (injunction may issue if there are "sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits"). For an in depth discussion and analysis of the varying
standards for issuing preliminary injunctions, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 158;
Wolf, supra note 153.
162. Nineteenth Century English and American precedents relied on equity doc
trines to support the legal proposition that even where a movant's legal right to interim
relief may be in doubt, the court may nevertheless issue an injunction if the moving party
will suffer greater harm if the injunction is denied than the opposing party will suffer if the
stay is granted. Wolf, supra note 153, at 177 (citing W. KERR, INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY
(1871».
163. See Jackson Dairy, 596 F.2d at 72. Under the Jackson Dairy test, the court
may grant interim relief when the moving party demonstrates that it will suffer irreparable
harm, which means that a monetary award would not be. an adequate remedy. Addition
ally, the moving party must show either that it is likely to succeed on the merits or that
there are sufficiently serious questions on the merits to make them a fair ground for litiga
tion. If the moving party demonstrates sufficiently serious questions on the merits, it must
also show a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in its favor. Id.
164. Wells, supra note 154, at 71; see also Note, supra note 138, at 1251. "The state
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junction may influence the state court's answer to the question(s) certi
fied, but the state court is not bound by the federal court's preliminary
interpretation. 16S Thus, a grant of interim relief can prevent the chil
ling effect during certification and will interfere less with state policy
than would invalidation of the statute. Finally, if a federal court does
not want to grant a formal preliminary injunction, the same objective
is attainable if the state enforcement authority agrees not to prosecute
during the certification process. 166
CONCLUSION

Certification represents the most reasonable way for federal
courts to. protect individuals from unconstitutionally overbroad stat
utes without unnecessarily interfering with state legislative policy.
incurs much greater harm from inaccurate construction of the statute than from interim
relief, which merely causes delay in achieving the state's objective and not total frustration
of the objective itself." Id. at 1251-52.
165. Wells, supra note 154, at 69.
166. Id. at 84; see also supra note 152.
Interim relief will relieve the chilling effect during the certification process, but a ques
tion remains as to whether the state may retroactively enforce the statute if the federal
court ultimately upholds the statute based upon a state court narrowing construction.
Although beyond the scope of this note, retroactive enforcement would seem to undermine
the prevention of the chilling effect and the reason for granting the interim relief in the first
place, for a person may be just as deterred by delayed prosecution.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that an overbreadth challenge to a
Massachusetts state law became moot after the Massachusetts legislature amended the stat
ute to cure its overbreadth. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633,2637-38 (1989).
Concurring in the judgment that vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings as
to whether the former version of the statute could be constitutionally applied to the appel
lant, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's belief that a facial overbreadth challenge is
unavailable once the statute is amended. He noted that "[i]f the promulgation of overbroad
laws ... was cost free, ... then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to
stay within constitutional bounds in the first place." Id. at 2639-40 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
While acknowledging that legislators may not be as careful to avoid careless drafting if
they know they can cure their own mistakes by amending the statute, the Court distin
guished the situation in which a state court provides the narrowing construction. See Os
borne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1702 (1990). Justice White noted that legislators cannot be
certain that the statute they draft will be saved by a narrowing construction or invalidated
for overbreadth. Despite the distinction, the Court observed that "[e]ven if construed to
obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due
Process Clause." Id. This is because the Due Process Clause requires fair warning to the
defendant that the statute, as construed, covers his conduct. Id. at 1703 n.16.
It seems, therefore, that even if a federal court grants interim relief during the certifica
tion process and later upholds the challenged statute based upon a state court limiting
construction, there could be no retroactive enforcement unless the defendant had fair no
tice that his conduct was proscribed by the statute as construed by the state court. Thus,
lost enforcement may be the necessary cost of preserving state policy when the alternative
is a complete facial invalidation of state law.
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Certification allows expeditious and authoritative construction of state
law before federal courts evaluate the constitutionality of the statute.
The focus of certification in facial overbreadth challenges to un
construed state statutes should return to the federalism concerns it is
designed to serve. Federal courts should abolish the discretionary
"readily susceptible" test currently used in certification cases. The test
is directed at the wrong court as it invites federal courts to rule on the
merits of state law issues. Furthermore, the test is unworkable be
cause it focuses on the illusive distinction between narrowly constru
ing and rewriting a statute.
A better solution for respecting federal-state court comity is to
require certification before a federal court invalidates an unconstrued
state statute because state courts are better equipped to evaluate the
meaning and scope of state law. Interim relief during the certification
process should alleviate any chilling effect on constitutionally pro
tected rights. Any subsequent federal court invalidation is thus neces
sary and not premature.
Beth A. Hardy

